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‘Trade for All’ – All for Trade? The EU’s New Strategy  
Sieglinde Gstöhl 
On 14 October 2015 the European Commission 
presented its new strategy ‘Trade for All: Towards a 
more Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’. 
According to Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, the 
trade policy of the European Union (EU) “must become 
more effective, more transparent and more in tune with 
our values” − in short, “it must become more 
responsible”, delivering growth and jobs without 
compromising core principles. Whereas any trade 
measure unavoidably entails distributional effects with 
winners and losers, the new strategy claims “that EU 
trade policy is for all”. The Policy Brief traces the EU’s 
road to this ‘all inclusive’ strategy and discusses its 
novelties and challenges. 
 
The road to ‘Trade for All’ 
 
Since the late 1990s the European Commission has 
pragmatically adapted its trade strategy every few years. 
In the wake of the collapse of communism, the 
worldwide embrace of neoliberalism and the spreading of 
anti-globalisation protests, the EU originally pursued a 
policy of ‘managed globalisation’, aiming at the adoption 
of global rules and the strengthening of international 
regimes. It strongly advocated the launch of a new 
multilateral trade round in the still young World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
announced in 1999 a moratorium on new bilateral and 
plurilateral trade negotiations for the Round’s duration.  
 
A few years later, the stagnation of the Doha Round and 
the new assertiveness of the emerging economies led to 
a questioning of this doctrine. The United States and 
others engaged in ‘competitive liberalisation’ by 
concluding ambitious bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs), while the EU came to a sobering assessment of its 
‘Lisbon Strategy’ (2000), which had failed to turn Europe 
into the world’s most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy by 2010. As part of the much 
less ambitious ‘renewed Lisbon Strategy’ (2005), trade 
was to primarily contribute to growth and jobs. In the 
past the EU had often concluded trade agreements for 
political reasons, in particular with neighbouring 
countries and former colonies. At the same time, the 
increasing fragmentation of global supply chains called 
for a common approach to ‘behind-the-border issues’ 
such as competition policy, public procurement, 
investment, intellectual property, or labour and 
environmental standards. Whereas in the WTO the EU 
failed to keep the major ‘Singapore issues’ (competition 
policy, public procurement, investment protection) on 
the agenda, it enjoyed more bargaining leverage to 
incorporate such ‘WTO+’ issues into bilateral FTAs, 
making them deeper and more comprehensive.  
 
Executive Summary 
> The ‘Trade for All’ strategy presented in late 2015 
is the culmination of a decade-long re-orientation 
of EU trade policy towards more competitiveness, 
including a shift to reciprocal free trade with 
developing countries. 
> The rise of the emerging economies and the 
stagnation of the Doha Round contributed to a 
proliferation of deeper and more comprehensive 
bilateral free trade agreements.  
> While EU trade policy has become more strategic, 
aiming at bigger partners, it has not yet found a 
way to deal with China and Russia.  
> ‘Trade for All’ also aims to respond to the heated 
debates about the TTIP negotiations by promoting 
transparency and high standards of protection.  
> Finally, implementing a ‘more responsible’ EU 
trade policy will require a convergence of rhetoric 
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Going global – bilaterally  
 
In 2006 Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson launched 
the ‘Global Europe’ trade strategy that singled out future 
FTA partners based on their market potential (economic 
size and growth), level of protection against EU export 
interests and negotiations with EU competitors. ‘Global 
Europe’ envisaged in particular bloc-to-bloc agreements 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Mercosur and the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as 
bilateral deals with important trading partners such as 
South Korea, India and Russia. At the same time, a 
separate Communication was dedicated to China as “the 
single greatest test of Europe’s capacity to make 
globalisation an opportunity for jobs and growth”. In the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
the EU began to negotiate bilateral association 
agreements including Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Areas (DCFTAs), with Ukraine at the forefront.  
 
The far-reaching FTA with South Korea, signed in 2010, 
was celebrated as a benchmark agreement: the first of a 
‘new generation’ of FTAs, the first with an Asian country 
and the first to be ratified by the European Parliament. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Parliament had acquired more powers, foreign 
direct investment was added to the EU’s exclusive 
competence and the common commercial policy was 
placed within the EU’s objectives of external action.  
 
In reaction to the global economic and financial crisis that 
hit Europe in 2008, the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, following 
up on the ‘renewed Lisbon Strategy’, aimed at smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. In this context, Trade 
Commissioner Karel De Gucht presented the 2010 ‘Trade, 
Growth and World Affairs’ (TGWA) strategy as an update 
of the ‘Global Europe’ strategy. It emphasised reciprocity 
– especially vis-à-vis the emerging economies – and that 
the EU’s trade and foreign policies should be “mutually 
reinforcing”, encouraging partners to promote the 
respect of human rights, labour and environmental 
standards. In addition to the already standard human 
rights clause, new provisions on sustainable development 




The target partners of TGWA were for the first time 
heavy weights like Canada, Japan, the United States and – 
as the region-to-region approach had failed – bilateral 
agreements with individual ASEAN countries such as 
Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand. While the 
United States engaged with 11 partners in a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, the EU launched talks on a Bilateral 
Investment Agreement (BIT) with China. The negotiations 
of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), opened in 2013, were perceived as a strategic 
response to the changing global trading order, with the 
potential to kick-start the WTO negotiations again.  
 
The magnitude of the expected economic benefits was 
contentious, but TTIP was believed to strengthen the 
transatlantic alliance between like-minded democratic 
powers in an era of conflicts, and to allow the West to 
shape the future regulatory global framework for trade 
and investment. The notion of TTIP as a ‘living 
agreement’ – allowing regulators to identify new areas 
for convergence (mutual recognition, equivalence or best 
practices) without re-opening the treaty – has led to 
concerns that a joint regulatory cooperation body would 
take decisions beyond democratic control. However, such 
a body cannot replace the respective administrative, 
regulatory or legislative procedures on either side of the 
Atlantic. Moreover, the investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) mechanism fuelled fears that firms − 
mainly big business − could sue EU governments for 
compensation outside the normal judicial process if their 
investor rights were curtailed by public policies.  
 
‘Trade for All’: a shopping list or a strategic turn? 
 
Amidst this increasing controversy over TTIP and at the 
half-way juncture of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, the new 
Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström presented the 
‘Trade for All’ strategy in 2015.  
 
A response to TTIP and beyond 
 
In this strategy, the Commission has to some extent 
taken on board demands of critics as regards 
transparency, regulatory issues and dispute settlement in 
investment as well as concerns about the external effects 
of FTAs. In an unprecedented effort, it has been 
publishing virtually all the EU’s negotiating positions and 
proposals, starting with a declassification of the (already 
leaked) TTIP negotiating mandate. The strategy makes 
this greater transparency in trade negotiations standard 
practice and extends it to trade defence as well. After an 
online consultation on ISDS in TTIP, the Commission 
proposed to replace this mechanism – present in many 
BITs concluded by EU member states – in all ongoing and 
future agreements by an Investment Court System that 
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In addition, the strategy places a strong focus on the 
liberalisation of services trade, the promotion of mobility 
for professionals, digital trade and small and medium-
sized enterprises which make up the backbone of the 
European economy. Moreover, future trade agreements 
are to include an energy and raw materials chapter. With 
regard to regulatory cooperation, the Communication 
attempts to counter public concerns by clearly stating 
that no trade agreement will ever lower levels of 
regulatory protection and that the right to regulate will 
always be protected.  
 
Beyond safeguarding the European social and regulatory 
model at home, the trade strategy also aims to use trade 
agreements and preferences to promote abroad values 
associated with the notions of sustainable, inclusive, 
climate- and environmentally-friendly and ethical trade. 
While the inclusion and monitoring of human rights, 
labour rights and sustainable development is not new, 
the explicit support for ‘fair trade’, the conservation of 
natural resources and the fight against climate change 
and corruption in FTAs as well as the commitment to 
ensuring a responsible management of supply chains or 
to abstain from requiring governments to privatise public 
services (like water, education or health) are new steps.  
 
This ‘shopping list’ does not leave much to be desired. 
One might point to the omission of gender and the 
economic empowerment of women as crucial actors in 
poverty eradication; or to the traditional focus on trade 
distortion in agricultural markets and food production 
rather than on small farmers, local production and pro-
poor rural development.  
 
Of course, while the inclusion of values in trade policy 
may make EU external action more coherent, others may 
consider it ‘hidden protectionism’. Trade policy inevitably 
produces, at least in the short run, losers that will have to 
adapt to the changing circumstances. It creates tensions 
between overall growth and sectoral job losses, between 
sustainable development and export-led growth or 
diversification, between market opening and infant 
industry protection in developing countries, between 
bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation, and so on. 
In other words, trade measures are not automatically ‘for 
all’ − nor are all for trade.  
 
Missing: China and Russia 
 
In terms of partners, ‘Trade for All’ appears to prioritise 
major projects: the Doha Round and WTO-related 
plurilateral agreements (like the Trade in Services 
Agreement or the Environmental Goods Agreement), 
TTIP, the EU-Japan FTA and a continued ‘pivot to Asia’ 
with new negotiations in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Indonesia) 
but also a modernisation of the older FTAs with Mexico 
and Chile as well as the customs union with Turkey. The 
Commission also hopes to restart FTA negotiations with 
ASEAN as a group, building on the individual agreements.  
 
Yet, the new trade strategy remains silent about how the 
EU intends to engage with its second and third largest 
trading partners: China and Russia. The BIT with China 
might serve as a test case that could eventually lead to a 
bilateral FTA − based on China’s future market economy 
status at the WTO on which the document remains mute 
as well. Any resumption of negotiations on a new trade 
agreement with the Russian Federation requires 
overcoming the current sanctions. Whereas China 
primarily poses an economic challenge, Russia represents 
a political challenge for the EU. Regarding the other BRIC 
countries, the on-going FTA negotiations with India and 
with Mercosur have been dragging on and further 
highlight the EU’s difficulties to negotiate with partners 
of equal size. The EU’s ‘strategic turn’ thus encounters 
many obstacles in practice. 
 
Finally, the strategy calls for a ‘redefined’ relationship 
with Africa, the fastest growing continent. It focuses on 
the implementation of existing rather than new initiatives 
and highlights the key role of regional integration to 
promote the extremely low intra-continental trade. Since 
2002 the Commission has, with limited success and much 
criticism, negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with regional groups of African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries. However, some of these groups do not 
match the integration schemes on the ground. Moreover, 
the reciprocal EPAs, which replace the non-reciprocal 
trade preferences of the Cotonou Agreement to make 
them WTO compatible, contain review clauses to extend 
to trade in services and investment in the future. With 
the 2014 reform of its Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) the EU drastically reduced the number of 
beneficiaries to focus on those countries most in need, 
while incentivising the others to conclude FTAs such as 
the EPAs. The EU continues to support in particular the 
least developed countries, for instance by pushing for 
special conditions in the WTO – most recently at the 
Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December 2015 
which granted them preferential treatment for services 
and rules of origins and committed to eliminate subsidies 
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A ‘more responsible’ EU trade strategy? 
 
Values should inform interests and actions. In this regard, 
the ‘Trade for All’ strategy is bound to face a classical 
dilemma. While the Commission seems more determined 
than ever to defend Europe’s commercial and strategic 
interests, it is also committed to upholding a higher 
number of values close to Europeans’ hearts. However, 
the EU has a long record of inconsistent application of 
political conditionality (such as human rights clauses in 
trade agreements, the withdrawal of GSP preferences or 
other trade-related sanctions).  
 
That trade agreements can be powerful foreign policy 
instruments must have dawned upon the EU at the latest 
with the Ukraine crisis in 2013. Russia interpreted the 
DCFTAs with the EU’s Eastern partners as a geopolitical 
offensive to which it responded with the creation of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, its enlargement to Armenia 
and interference on Ukrainian territory. The new strategy 
acknowledges that “trade policy has significant 
repercussions on the geopolitical landscape”. TTIP is 
another agreement whose geopolitical implications 
needs careful consideration, especially with regard to the 
question how this ‘mega-regional’ deal could be 
multilateralised, which the strategy leaves open.  
 
To render a ‘more responsible’ trade policy a ‘mission 
possible’ for the EU requires a convergence of rhetoric 
and action and a reconciliation of European interests and 
values − with values expected to prevail over interests in 
case of conflict. In this regard it should be kept in mind 
that the EU’s trade strategy is not the only strategy to 
have undergone a review in 2015, but so have the ENP 
and the European Security Strategy. ‘Trade for All’ 
recognises that, contrary to earlier assumptions, not all 
ENP countries are interested in closer integration with 
the EU and that trade agreements other than the DCFTAs 
might be needed. This was confirmed in the ENP review 
issued a month later which, at the same time however, 
retreated on values. With regard to the new EU Global 
Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, due in June 2016, 
the European External Action Service acknowledges that 
in a more connected, contested and complex world, the 
EU needs a joined-up approach to external action. Time 
to remember that a real strategy, even if it attempts to 
address all important issues, must single out priorities 
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